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Regulating Compounding Pharmacies after NECC
Kevin Outterson, J.D.

F

ood and Drug Administration (FDA) rules are often forged in crisis. After the 1937 sulfanilamide
disaster that killed more than 100 people, Congress
passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
requiring drugs to be safe and
properly labeled. In 1962, a requirement was introduced for
proof of drug efficacy through
“adequate and well-controlled investigations,” partly in response
to the thalidomide tragedy. Rules
protecting human-research subjects owe a debt to Tuskegee and
Nuremberg. Sometimes it takes a
disaster to spur the adoption of
appropriate regulation.
Today, compounding pharmacies are at the center of a controversy after a rare outbreak of fungal meningitis that was traced to
several lots of the injectable glucocorticoid methylprednisolone acetate compounded by the New
England Compounding Center
(NECC). Congress is already discussing new federal regulations.
Since 1938, the FDA has had
clear authority to regulate drug
manufacturing, but compound-

ing falls into a gray area between
state and federal oversight. The
FDA’s authority here is generally
limited to reacting to problems
identified by others. Traditional
compounding pharmacies are not
registered with the FDA as drug
manufacturers, the agency doesn’t
approve their prescriptions before marketing, and related adverse events need not be reported
to the FDA. State law generally
controls recordkeeping, certifications, and licensing for compounding pharmacies (see timeline).
Such a regulatory structure is
not unusual: many U.S. health
care laws embrace federalism
principles, preserving substantial
realms for state control. States
have primary authority over the
practice of both medicine and
pharmacy. But over time, compounding has evolved into a busi-
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ness far removed from the mortar and pestle. Once it becomes
an industrial-scale national business, the arguments for federal
regulation become stronger.
For more than two decades,
the FDA has struggled to regulate industrial-scale compounding. In 1992, it issued a Compliance Policy Guide, attempting to
police the line between traditional compounding and drug manufacturing. This guide attracted
enough criticism that Congress
created a safe-harbor compounding statute in 1997, amending the
FDCA with a new section, 503A.
But 2 days before this law was
to take effect, seven compounding pharmacies sued to block it.
Section 503A(c) banned the advertising and promotion of compounded drugs; the theory was
that since traditional compounding occurred in response to individual prescriptions, advertising
was unnecessary. The advertising
ban was the law’s Achilles’ heel.
In 2002, in a 5-to-4 decision in
Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center (an early example of the
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NECC Compliance with Existing FDA Compliance Policy Guide.
NECC Compliance, per FDA and
Massachusetts Interim Reports

Rule Violation as Listed in the 2002 Compliance Policy Guide
Compounding of drugs in anticipation of receiving prescriptions, except in very limited quantities
in relation to the amounts of drugs compounded after receiving valid prescriptions

NECC did not have valid prescriptions for all
compounded drugs

Compounding drugs that were withdrawn or removed from the market for safety reasons

No evidence thus far

Compounding finished drugs from bulk active ingredients that are not components of FDA-approved
drugs without an FDA-sanctioned Investigational New Drug Application

No evidence thus far

Receiving, storing, or using drug substances without first obtaining written assurance from the supplier that each lot of the drug substance has been made in an FDA-registered facility

No evidence thus far

Receiving, storing, or using drug components not guaranteed or otherwise determined to meet
official compendia requirements

No evidence thus far

Using commercial-scale manufacturing or testing equipment for compounding drug products

NECC appears to have used commercial-scale
manufacturing or testing equipment

Compounding drugs for third parties who resell to individual patients or offering compounded drug
products at wholesale to other state-licensed persons or commercial entities for resale

Unclear thus far

Compounding drug products that are commercially available in the marketplace or that are essentially
copies of commercially available FDA-approved drug products (In certain circumstances, it may be
appropriate for a pharmacist to compound a small quantity of a drug that is only slightly different
from an FDA-approved drug that is commercially available. In these circumstances, the FDA will
consider whether there is documentation of the medical need for the particular variation of the
compound for the particular patient.)

NECC produced a preservative-free version
of a commercially available drug, methylprednisolone acetate

Failing to operate in conformance with applicable state law regulating the practice of pharmacy

NECC appears to have violated Massachusetts law

use of free speech against public
health regulation),1 the Supreme
Court ruled that compounders
have a constitutional right to advertise their drugs.
The FDA salvaged the Compliance Policy Guide by reissuing it
without the advertising and interstate-shipment provisions, reemphasizing the agency’s author-

ity under the FDCA. The 2002
Guide articulated nine factors that
the FDA would consider as relevant, including many drawn from
the nonadvertising provisions of
Section 503A. Several of these
factors appear to have been violated by NECC (see table).
Some observers have chastised
the FDA for not acting sooner

against NECC, given the agency’s
authority to block illegal drug
manufacturing. But this critique
ignores the complex regulatory
history. FDA authority over compounding has never been straightforward, and though the agency
can react once a problem is obvious, it’s unclear how it should
proactively gather information on
April 9, 2002

Oct. 10, 1962

Mass. and FDA inspectors visit NECC in response to concerns about failure
Kefauver–Harris Amendments signed,
to comply with standards for compounding.
Food, Drug, requiring drug manufacturers to prove
and Cosmetic efficacy. Compounded drugs do not
Feb. 6, 2001
Act (FDCA), require FDA premarketing approval. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees advertising restrictions are unconstituregulating
tional and cannot be severed from Section 503A. FDA appeals to Supreme Court.
drug safety
Sept. 16, 1999
and labeling,
Nevada federal district court finds advertising restrictions in Section 503A unconstitutional. FDA appeals.
signed into
law.
June 25, 1938

Nov. 19, 1998
Seven compounding pharmacies file suit, claiming Section 503A violates their First Amendment rights.

1940 1950 1960 1970

1980

1990

1995

In Thompson v.
Western States,
Supreme Court
agrees the advertising restrictions
are unconstitutional; doesn’t
address severability; appellate
decision stands.

2000
Nov. 21, 1997

Early 1990s

Apr. 29, 2002

Feb. 9, 1998

Signing of FDA Modernization Act, whose
New England Compounding
Section 503A regulates compounding and
Pharmacy formed in Mass.,
generally exempts individual compounding
doing business as New England
March 16, 1992
from the adulteration, misbranding, and
Compounding Center (NECC).
FDA issues Compliance Policy Guide on compounding,
new-drug rules for manufacturers.
May 29, 2002
clarifying when compounding becomes illegal drug
FDA reissues 1992 Compliance Policy Guide on
manufacturing, misbranding, or adulteration.
compounding, with advertising provisions removed.

FDA begins investigating compounding
pharmacies for possible FDCA violations.

Oct. 2002

FDA receives
report of contaminated
methylprednisolone acetate.
Investigations
continue.

Oct. 23, 2003
Senate holds hearings on compounding; testimony includes reports on compounding pharmacies, finding serious quality problems.

History of FDA Regulation Relevant to Compounding at NECC.

1970
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potential violations before a crisis erupts. The thousands of U.S.
compounding pharmacies are not
registered with the FDA; they are
not subject to federal recordkeeping and reporting rules for drug
manufacturers; and, through litigation, the FDA can be blocked
for many months from visiting
them. Without information about
the actual conditions in compounding pharmacies, regulators
cannot act to address violations.
It’s possible that if the Supreme
Court hadn’t struck down Section 503A, the tragedy at NECC
could have been averted. Several
features of that law are relevant.
First, traditional compounding
was limited to a pharmacist or a
physician serving a specific patient. Section 503A also permitted
compounding of drugs “in limited
quantities before the receipt of a
valid prescription order . . . based
on a history of . . . receiving valid prescription orders.” According
to the preliminary report from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
NECC far exceeded these limits
in preparing and shipping vials of
methylprednisolone acetate.2 Once
2004

Mass. inspects NECC at least
three times, accompanied by
FDA at least twice. Mass. report
completed in March; proposed
consent decree sent to NECC in
October.

disconnected from individual patients, compounding increasingly
resembles drug manufacturing.
Second, compounding is not
needed if a drug is commercially
available from an FDA-regulated
facility. Section 503A prohibited
compounding “regularly or in inordinate amounts” any drugs that
were “essentially copies of a commercially available drug product.”
FDA-approved methylprednisolone
acetate is sold by Pfizer and two
generics companies, but since
NECC’s version did not contain
preservatives, it could sidestep this
regulatory process — with tragic
results.
Third, Congress recognized
that states could effectively regulate traditional compounding
pharmacies, but national-scale
businesses required federal coordination. Section 503A provided
a test for distinguishing between
the two: it limited interstate
shipments to no more than 5% of
the compounder’s business, unless
the home state had entered into
a “memorandum of understanding” with the FDA, bolstering
state and federal cooperation.

NECC shipped substantial quantities of drugs to many states. If
Section 503A had not been struck
down, both the FDA and Massachusetts would have been more
directly involved in regulating
NECC for more than a decade.
Yet contamination is only one
of five categories of risk associated with compounding pharmacies; the others are subpotency,
superpotency, overmedication, and
medication replacement.3 Other
policy levers that may be needed
include enhanced transparency for
state-level regulation, mandatory
disclosures to physicians and patients, mandatory reporting of adverse events, user fees to support
oversight, clear FDA authority to
register and inspect nontraditional compounding pharmacies, enhanced incentives for internal
whistleblowers, and modification
of reimbursement rules to blunt
the economic incentives driving
industrial-scale compounding.
Fungal contamination at NECC
has sickened more than 400 patients and killed at least 29. But
it’s important to note that many
patients received these sterile inSept. 26, 2012

July 18, 2008

Mass. begins on-site investigations at NECC. Three
lots of methylprednisolone acetate voluntarily recalled.

In Medical Center Pharmacy v. Mukasey, Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagrees with Ninth
Circuit on severability; the balance of Section
503A again in force in Tex., La., and Miss.

Sept. 18 2012

Vanderbilt physicians report a case of fungal
meningitis associated with sterile injection.

2006

Mass. settles with NECC without disciplinary action.
Second FDA compounding study still finds safety
problems.
2005

May 21, 2012, to Sept. 18, 2012

NECC prepares several lots of methylprednisolone
acetate since linked to fungal contamination.

2010

2011

Draft Senate legislation to regulate
compounding is successfully opposed
by industry. FDA Amendments Act,
signed on September 27, doesn’t
strengthen compounding regulation.

NECC surrenders
its Mass. pharmacy
license.
Oct. 23, 2012

Mass.
releases
preliminary
report on
NECC.

2012
Sept. 24, 2012

2007

Oct. 9, 2012

Tenn. Dept. of Health informs Mass. Dept. of Public Health about six
cases of fungal meningitis tied to NECC methylprednisolone acetate.
Oct. 1, 2012

FDA begins on-site inspections at NECC.

Oct. 26, 2012

FDA releases
Form 483,
Inspectional
Observations
at NECC.

Oct. 4, 2012
Dec. 4, 2006
FDA sends warning letter to NECC
alleging multiple violations.

Voluntary recall expands to all NECC compounded products.
Nov. 1, 2012

VALID Compounding Act, draft legislation for regulating compounding pharmacies, announced.
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jections for back and joint pain, a
procedure that lacks high-quality
evidence of efficacy.4,5 These problems cannot be laid entirely at the
feet of compounders when clinicians persist in clinical practices
despite weak evidence of efficacy.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
From Boston University School of Law, Boston.
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Drug Policy for an Aging Population — The European Medicines
Agency’s Geriatric Medicines Strategy
Francesca Cerreta, Pharm.D., Hans-Georg Eichler, M.D., and Guido Rasi, M.D.

I

n almost every country, the proportion of people over 60 years
of age is growing faster than any
other age group, as a result of
longer life expectancy and declining fertility rates. In Europe, the
median age is already the highest
in the world, and in 2050 there
are projected to be 88.5 million
Americans 65 years old or older
— more than double the 40.3 million in the 2010 census.
Although population aging is
a mark of the success of public
health policies, it also challenges
the established way of implementing such policies. In the case of
the European Medicines Agency
(EMA), it has prompted an analysis of whether the regulatory system is adapted to taking the
needs of older people into account
in the development, approval, and
use of medications.
The process started in 2006,
when the EMA provided an opinion on the adequacy of guidance
on the elderly regarding medicinal products. In 2011, the agency’s Committee for Human Medicinal Products adopted the EMA
geriatric medicines strategy,1
marking its commitment to improving our understanding of how
best to evaluate the benefit–risk
1972

ratio for a medication in older
patients.
First, the strategy recognizes
that older people are the main
users of medications — not a
minority or special population (a
fundamental difference between
the geriatric and pediatric populations). Therefore, legislative and
regulatory frameworks must be
designed to ensure that the use
of newly approved medicines in
the intended population is supported by relevant data on the
benefit–risk balance. The strategy’s second aim is to improve
the availability of information to
patients and prescribers, to support safer use of medications.
Analysis of the data submitted
in support of recent applications
for marketing authorization shows
that the current regulatory environment has ensured reasonable
representation of “younger old”
patients, but drug-usage patterns reveal a high prevalence of
use in “older old” patients (see
graph). Patients who are 75 years
old or older often present a complex picture involving coexisting
conditions and frailty: they are
the fastest-growing demographic
group but are largely underrepresented in clinical trials given
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their disproportionately high actual use of drugs. This imbalance
will make it increasingly difficult
and potentially inappropriate to
extrapolate data to these patients.2
Though trials are less likely to
set unjustified age limits than
they were a few decades ago, this
improvement must be considered
in the context of a rapidly aging
population and the continued
widespread use of exclusion criteria based on coexisting conditions. Corrective efforts must be
maintained to ensure that a representative population of patients
covering the entire age range is
studied in the preauthorization
phase, in accordance with international guidelines.3
Chronologic age alone is inadequate for characterizing the population enrolled in a clinical trial.
Frailty is a predictor of clinical
outcomes,4 and the reduction of
frailty has benefits for individuals
and society. The EMA is exploring the possibility of reaching a
consensus on an operational definition of frailty and tools for
evaluating it that could be used
for clinical research and to guide
therapeutic decisions.
Medications commonly prescribed to treat other conditions
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